Affondamento Pescecane 14.05.1942

[Platon Alexiades]

At 1410 hours on 14 May 1942, the Italian fishing vessel Pescecane, moored at Sousse (Tunisia), was victim of an explosion in the bow and sank. I am trying to find out:

 

1. if it was victim of sabotage? It seems there is no other conclusion for an explosion in the bow.

2. the characteristics of the vessel (tonnage, year of construction, etc.). Navi Mercantili Perdute lists it but gives no details.

3. How often did Italian fishing vessels operated in Tunisian waters at that time? Was Pescecane on a special mission?

 

Thanks.

 

Platon

Edited March 6, 2017 by Platon Alexiades

[Francesco De Domenico]

I have no specific information on PESCECANE. I can only try a wild guess. As we know, among the agreements the Vichy government reached with Germany and Italy at the Tripartite Armistice Commission sitting in Wiesbaden as an Ersatz, a substitute for the Paris protocols of 27/28 May, 1941 signed by Darlan but not approved by Vichy, was the monthly supply, from March, 1941, to each of the two countries of 25 to 30,000 tons of phosphates from North Africa (see Amiral Auphan, op. cit.).

The Italian cargo steamer ASSUNTA DE GREGORI, 4,219 grt/1913, had been in Sfax loading phosphates from April 9 to 19, 1942, a very long time due to the limited co-operation offered from the port authorities. Just six hours after her sailing from Sfax, bound for Naples under the escort of torpedo-boat CASTORE from Tripoli, she was torpedoed and sunk by submarine P 35/UMBRA.

Foul play in Sfax was obviously suspected, and since PESCECANE was a fishing vessel owned by the Italian consulate in Algiers, it can be surmised that she was in Sousse one month later to gather information on the subject.

As you know, the Germans had obtained the establishment of German military observers in Algiers and Casablanca to check on the actual fulfilling of the agreements with Vichy, but not in Tunis nor in Dakar. So the Italians were left to their own devices in Tunisia.

[Platon Alexiades]

Dear Francesco,

 

Many thanks for your suggestions. A little correction: my source shows that Pescecane was registered with the Italian consulate at Sousse (Susa). She may have been used for communication purposes but I have no proof. Are there any details available on the vessels carrying phosphate from Tunisia to Italy and the list of their trips ?

 

All the best,

 

Platon

[Francesco De Domenico]

It's a long story.

 

27 Feb./2 Mar. 1941 P.fo STURLA (German) Tripoli to Sfax, various escorts

4/5 Mar. 1941 P.fi FLORIDA II, AUDACE, PEGLI Tripoli to Sfax and Sousse, escort Tp MONTANARI

9/15 Mar. 1941 P.fo DELFIN Tripoli to Sfax, escort Mna LUIGI RIZZO until Zuara

23/24 Mar. 1941 P.fo SANTA PAOLA Tripoli to Sfax, escort Tp PLEIADI, POLLUCE up to the Kerkennah islands

27/29 Mar. 1941 P.fo HONOR Tripoli to Sfax, escort Tp PALLADE

23/24 Apr. 1941 P.fo SECURITAS Tripoli for Sfax, escort Tp SIRTORI, grounded on the Kerkennah bank, refloated, to Biserta 24 Apr.

29 Aug./1 Sept. 1941 M.cist. (vinaccera, winecarrier) LUPA Tripoli to Tunis, various escorts; back to Tripoli 5/9 Sept., various escorts

23/28 Dec. 1941 P.cist. LENEO Tripoli to Tunis (to pick up diesel oil from the local stocks included in the agreement); back to Tripoli 2/7 Jan. 1942

5/7 Dec. 1941 P.fo BOLSENA Tripoli to Tunis, back to Tripoli 5/7 Jan. 1942

25 Dec. 1941 P.fo SANT'ANTONIO (ex Yugoslavian ANTON) Tunis to Tripoli

31 Dec. 1941/1 Jan. 1942 P.fo STURLA (German) Palermo to Sousse, escort part of the way Tp PARTENOPE; back to Tripoli 1/3 Jan. 1942, escort Tp CALLIOPE

5/9 Jan. 1942 P.cist. LENEO Tripoli to Tunis

29/31 Jan. 1942 P.fo SANT'ANTONIO Tripoli to Tunis, back to Tripoli 10/12 Mar. 1942

8/9 Apr. 1942 P.fo ASSUNTA DE GREGORI Tripoli to Sfax, escort Tp PRESTINARI; sails en route Naples at 10.00 19 April, escort Tp CASTORE, torpedoed and sunk by HMS UMBRA off the Kerkennah islands, 18 missing among the crew

31 May/4 June 1942 M.cist. LUPA Tunis to Tripoli

17/22 June 1942 M.cist. LUPA Tripoli to Tunis;

30 June/4 July 1942 P.fo NUMIDIA Tripoli to Sfax, escort Tp CLIMENE, and back to Naples, escort Tp CIGNO

5/9 Oct. 1942 M.vel. SAN MICHELE Sousse to Tripoli

6/8 Oct. 1942 M.cist. vinaccera LUPA Tunis for Tripoli, sunk by gunfire from HMS UNBENDING 8 Oct. 12 mi. SE of Djerba Island

8/11 Oct. 1942 P.fo SIRIO Sfax to Naples, escort Tp CENTAURO part of the way

27/30 Oct. 1942 Mn APRILE (ex French) Tripoli to Tunis

6/8 Nov. 1942 P.fo GIUSEPPINA Sousse to Tripoli

 

 

That's all I have. A few more remarks tomorrow.

[Francesco De Domenico]

From "La difesa del traffico con l'Africa settentrionale dal 1° ottobre 1941 al 30 settembre 1942", amm. di sq. Aldo Cocchia, USMM, 1962, page 264:

 

"E' appena necessario mettere in evidenza che l'ASSUNTA DE GREGORI sostò a Sfax, per fare il suo carico di fosfati, ben 10 giorni. Un periodo di tempo senz'altro eccessivo, che lasciava larghe possibilità agli informatori annidati nel sorgitore tunisino di segnalare la presenza e le previsioni di partenza del piroscafo a chi aveva interesse a conoscerle. Al riguardo Supermarina aveva già attirata l'attenzione del Comando Supremo sui pericoli che presentava lo approdo a Sfax, ma a tale porto per il carico dei fosfati non si poté rinunciare neanche dopo l'affondamento dell'ASSUNTA DE GREGORI. Si cercò però di fare in modo che la sosta fosse ridotta al minimo indispensabile, che l'arrivo dei piroscafi fosse improvviso e che alla partenza le navi mercantili fossero sempre scortate da unità dotate di ecogoniometro."

[Platon Alexiades]

Dear Francesco,

 

Many thanks for all these details. They are very much appreciated. I am in the process of expanding my research on the Mounier network. Despite its dismantlement by the Vichy police in the summer of 1941, it appears that some members were still at large and operating.

 

But so far, I have no definite proof that the sinking of Assunta de Gregori was a product of their nefarious activities. There is an ULTRA message warning of the imminent departure of Assunta de Gregori and this was probably the cause of the interception as there is evidence that P35 was waiting for a northbound ship. The torpedo boat Castore was equipped with ecogoniometro but heard nothing and saw nothing before the explosion on Assunta de Gregori.

 

All the best,

 

Platon

[Francesco De Domenico]

As we all know, the Italian "peritero" or ecogoniometro was of markedly inferior quality to the German one, not to speak of the British ASDIC. No radar, no effective sonar, ...

[Platon Alexiades]

I thought that the ecogoniometro was a copy of the German S-Gerät? This was still inferior to the British ASDIC but sound conditions in the Mediterranean were not as good as in the Atlantic. A lot depended on the training of the sonar operator. The one of the torpedo boat Circe appears to have been exceptionally good (HMS Tempest and HMS P38).

[Francesco Mattesini]

Non tutte le segnalazioni dell’asdic britannico, del sonar statunitense o dell'ecogoniometro tedesco e italiano, erano indicazione della presenza di sommergibili.

 

Durante la Battaglia di Mezzo Agosto (Operation Pedestal) molti contatti dell’asdic delle unità della scorta al convoglio diretto a Malta, furono falsati dalla calma oleosa del mare estivo, poiché la stratificazione dell’acqua defletteva gli impulsi sonori, cosicché, in particolare nei giorni 11 e 12 agosto, si ebbero indicazioni errate e una quantità di allarmi inesistenti.

[Francesco De Domenico]

On Monday I will post the relevant pages from USMM, amm. div. Vitaliano Rauber, "La lotta antisommergibile", 1978. The story is a bit complicated: aborted trials from 1931-32 on ct POERIO and Tp MEDICI, successful trials in June 1939 on subchaser ALBATROS but no production until early 1942, supply of some German apparatus at the end of 1941.

[Danilo Pellegrini]

...Durante la Battaglia di Mezzo Agosto (Operation Pedestal) molti contatti dell’asdic delle unità della scorta al convoglio diretto a Malta, furono falsati dalla calma oleosa del mare estivo, poiché la stratificazione dell’acqua defletteva gli impulsi sonori, cosicché, in particolare nei giorni 11 e 12 agosto, si ebbero indicazioni errate e una quantità di allarmi inesistenti.

 

Fenomeno senz'altro ascrivibile al termoclino estivo, sfruttato dai sommergibilisti tedeschi per l'occultamento del battello al di sotto dello strato riflettente.

[Platon Alexiades]

Franco and Danilo: thank you for your comments to which I concur.

[Francesco De Domenico]

Ecco le pagine dal volume USMM "La lotta antisommergibile" dell'amm. div. Vitaliano Rauber, Roma 1978

[Platon Alexiades]

Thank you Francesco. I do have the book but it is nice from you to share with the other readers.

 

Platon