Restano i dubbi sulla perdita del sommergibile ROMOLO

Dall’esame di queste considerazioni risulta che la C.I.S. nell’attribuire la perdita al citato attacco aereo deve superare due sostanziali incongruenze di spazio e di tempo. Vediamole:

1. A posizione dell’attacco indicata dall’aereo britannico, secondo il rapporto originale, è 37°20’N 16°15’E [Nota: nell’articolo citato in Storia Militare la posizione è erroneamente riportata a pag. 27 come 37°20’N 18°15’E e a pag. 28 come 37°20’N 16°18’E]. Tale posizione , a circa 45 mg S di Capo Spartivento, è lontana ed incompatibile con ogni possibile rotta o movimento del ROMOLO. La C.I.S. sembra superare il problema osservando che, poiché, secondo il rapporto fornito dal Naval Intelligence Department dell’US Navy su cui si basa la stessa C.I.S., l’aereo dichiara di aver seguito il sommergibile per circa due ore, lasciandolo a 15 mg dalla costa, la precedente posizione in coordinate, incompatibile con la rotta del ROMOLO, non risulterebbe attendibile.
   Commento: Pare evidente che valutazione della C.I.S. sia viziata dal presupposto, a priori, che l’attacco dell’aereo sia contro il ROMOLO.
2. Il ROMOLO alla partenza ha l’ordine di procedere in superficie fino al traverso di Capo Vaticano attraversando il 16 lo Stretto di Messina; successivamente alla partenza gli ordini sono modificati due volte prescrivendo al sommergibile la navigazione occulta ed in immersione per trovarsi all’altezza di Capo Spartivento prima alle 05.00 del 17 e poi alle 03.00 del 17. Se il sommergibile attaccato dall’aereo britannico alle 03.20 del 18 a S di Capo Spartivento fosse stato il ROMOLO, questa era evidentemente in forte ritardo, di circa 24 ore. La C.I.S. spiega questo ritardo con una possibile avaria o ritardi nella navigazione.
   Commento: La spiegazione circa il ritardo è certamente plausibile; quello che risulta semmai inspiegabile è che il ROMOLO, che si trovava in navigazione di trasferimento in acque nazionali con un appuntamento con una VAS per attraversare lo Stretto, non abbia ritenuto di dare alcuna comunicazione circa tempi e motivi del ritardo, con tutti i problemi e rischi conseguenti. Se anche la, o le, avarie avessero interessato l’apparato radio, il sommergibile sarebbe potuto entrare a Crotone, come farà poi il DANDOLO lo stesso giorno 18, per dare comunicazioni e chiedere eventuale assistenza.
   

Lasciamo ora da parte per un attimo il ROMOLO e le sue incongruenze e consideriamo i fatti della notte 17/18 Luglio 1943. Dalla documentazione alleata in questa notte risultano solo due attacchi aerei contro sommergibili nella zona ionica a Est della Sicilia.

1. Il Wellington MP 617 (F/O Lewis) “K” del 221 Squadron RAF decollato da Malta alle 20.44 del 17 riporta di aver avvistato ed attaccato alle 22.30 del 17 in pos. 37°19’N 16°41’E “a large Italian S/M” con “5 DC’s, one of which exploded under hull of S/M. S/M also attacked with gunfire. After attack S/M remained on surface circling lightly as if out of control with fumes and smokes from conning-tower. Destroyers brought to position.” …. “The enemy was last seen on a course 047° still on the surface, but the supporting destroyers failed to find it.”. Il risultato dell’attacco viene valutato come: “German [sic] U-boat probably heavy damaged”.
2. Il Wellington HZ 116 (P/O Austin) “B” del 221 Squadron RAF decollato da Malta alle 00.50 del 18 riporta di aver avvistato ed attaccato alle 03.20 del 18 in pos. 37°20’N 16°15’E “an enemy S/M (1000 tons)” con “5 DC’s stick straddled and one DC exploded under hull. S/M unable to submerge remained stationary for 30 minutes and then steered an erratic course leaving vast quantities of oil in its wake.” Il risultato dell’attacco viene valutato come: “German U-boat probably slightly damaged”. [Questo sarebbe l’attacco che colpisce il ROMOLO secondo la C.I.S.]
   

Da parte italo-tedesca sono segnalati due attacchi contro sommergibili:

1. Il smg DANDOLO alle 22.25 del 17 è attaccato in pos. 37°22’N 16°52’E [Nota: in alcune fonti, compreso “I sommergibili in Mediterraneo” tomo 2° pag.155 la posizione è erroneamente indicata come “20 miglia al largo di Catania”; la posizione in coordinate riportata è quella indicata nel rapporto di missione] da un aereo che sgancia alcune bombe, due che esplodono alla base della torretta, creando alcuni danni, e due a poppa, mentre altre due bombe restano incastrate nell’intercapedine, impedendo al sommergibile di immergersi. Il DANDOLO risponde con un colpo di cannone che fa desistere l’aereo. Il sommergibile dirige su Capo Colonne e poi su Crotone, dove arriva alle 10.40 del 18 e da dove rientrerà a Taranto scortato dalla corvetta SCIMITARRA .
2. Il smg AMBRA alle 03.20 del 18 mentre si trova in emersione a circa 45 miglia S di Capo Spartivento è attaccato da un aereo che sgancia sei bombe esplose vicinissime su entrambi i lati sotto lo scafo del sommergibile, causando gravi avarie a bordo e inibendo al battello la possibilità di immergersi. Il sommergibile rimane inizialmente immobilizzato e solo dopo diversi sforzi dell’equipaggio riesce a rimettere in moto i motori termici dirigendo lentamente in emersione su Messina, da dove proseguirà poi per Napoli a rimorchio della torpediniera PARTENOPE.
   

Dal confronto degli attacchi sembrano esserci pochi dubbi, vista la sostanziale corrispondenza di tempi, posizione e circostanze e considerato che non risultano altri attacchi aerei a sommergibili nella notte e nella zona in esame, che i due attacchi dei Wellingtons del 221 Squadron danneggiano rispettivamente i sommergibili DANDOLO e AMBRA. Il secondo attacco – quello delle 03.20 – nulla avrebbe quindi a che fare col ROMOLO, per ipotizzare il cui coinvolgimento occorrerebbe , tra l’altro, affrontare le incongruenze sopra segnalate.

E quindi per quanto riguarda la perdita del ROMOLO ?

Considerato che nel periodo dal 15 al 17 non risultano lungo la probabile rotta del ROMOLO, oltre a quelle già note, altre azioni correlabili con la perdita di un sommergibile , alla luce di quanto sopra, la sorte del ROMOLO va, per ora, ridefinita come:

“Perso per causa sconosciuta dopo aver lasciato Taranto nel pomeriggio del 15.07.43”

Per quanto riguarda le possibili cause , in mancanza di azioni belliche correlabili e considerato l’affrettato allestimento, lo scarso addestramento e la frettolosa riparazione dell’avaria al timone verticale che ritarda la partenza del ROMOLO, fatti bene evidenziati nel citato articolo di Prosperini e nelle considerazioni della stessa C.I.S., la causa più probabile per l’improvvisa scomparsa del sommergibile con tutto l’equipaggio sembra quella dell’incidente.

English Text

The loss of the submarine ROMOLO is attributed, by official sources, to likely internal explosion in the battery room or in the ammunition depot, consequential damages incurred as a result of the attack with bombs by a Wellington of 221 Squadron, at 03.20 on 18 July 1943 S of Cape Spartivento.
In the literature the loss is reported with roughly the same information; the only detailed study available is an article by Franco Prosperini appeared in the journal Storia Militare n. 148 where the official story of the loss is described in detail quoting the considerations of the Special Commission of Inquiry (CIS).
An examination of these considerations shows that the CIS, attributing the loss of ROMOLO to the aforementioned air attack must overcome two major inconsistencies of space and time.
Let's see:

1. The position of the attack indicated by the British aircraft, according to the original report, is 37° 20'N 16°15'E [Note: in the aforementioned article of Storia Militare the position is incorrectly reported in page 27 as 37°20'N 18°15'E and in page 28 as 37° 20'N 16°18'E]. The location, about 45 m. S of Cape Spartivento, is distant and incompatible with each possible route or movement of ROMOLO.
   The C.I.S. seems to overcome the problem by noting that, since, according to the report provided by the Naval Intelligence Department of the US Navy, the aircraft claims to have followed the submarine for about two hours leaving it 15 m. from the coast, the previous location in coordinates, incompatible with the course of ROMOLO, would not be reliable.
   Comment: It seems that the evaluation of CIS is vitiated assuming, “a priori”, that the attack of the aircraft was against the ROMOLO.
2. The ROMOLO at the departure has orders to proceed on surface until abeam of Cape Vaticano passing through the Strait of Messina on the 16; after the departure orders are changed twice prescribing to the submarine “navigazione occulta” and later submerged for being at Capo Spartivento first on the 17 at 05.00 and then at 03.00/17. If the submarine attacked by the British aircraft at 03.20/18 S of Cape Spartivento was the ROMOLO, she was clearly lagging behind for about 24 hours. The C.I.S. explains this delay with a possible failure or delay in the navigation.
   Comment: The explanation about the delay is certainly plausible; what, if anything, is inexplicable is that the ROMOLO, which was transferring in national waters with an appointment with a VAS to cross the Strait, did not give any communication about the times and reasons for the delay, with all the problems and consequent risks. Even if the damage had affected the radio equipment, the submarine could have entered in Crotone, as did the DANDOLO the same day, to report and ask for help.
   

Let us leave aside for a moment the ROMOLO and its inconsistencies and consider the facts of the night 17/18 July 1943.

The allied documentation shows on this night only two air attacks against submarines in the Ionian Sea to the east of Sicily:

1. The Wellington MP 617 (F / O Lewis) "K" of 221 Squadron RAF took off from Malta at 20.44 of the 17 and reported having spotted and attacked at 22.30/17 in pos. 37 ° 19'N 16 ° 41'E "a large Italian S / M" with "5 DC’s, one of which exploded under hull of S/M. S/M also attacked with gunfire. After attack S/M remained on surface circling lightly as if out of control with fumes and smokes from conning-tower. Destroyers brought to position.” …. “The enemy was last seen on a course 047° still on the surface, but the supporting destroyers failed to find it”. The result of the attack is evaluated as: "German [sic] U-boat probably heavy damaged."
2. The Wellington HZ 116 (P / O Austin) "B" of 221 Squadron RAF took off from Malta at 00:50 of the 18 and reported to have spotted and attacked at 03.20/18 in pos. 37 ° 20'N 16 ° 15'E "an enemy S/M (1000 tons)" with "5 DC's stick and straddled one DC exploded under hull. S/M unable to submerge remained stationary for 30 minutes and then steered an erratic course leaving vast quantities of oil in its wake". The result of the attack is evaluated as:" German U-boat probably slightly damaged. " [This would be the attack that hits the ROMOLO according to the CIS]
   

Axis submarines reported two attacks:

1. The submarine DANDOLO at 22.25/17 is attacked in position. 37 ° 22'N 16 ° 52'E [Note: in some sources, including " I sommergibili in Mediterraneo " Volume 2 ° pag.155 , the position is erroneously referred to as "20 miles off the coast of Catania"; the location in coordinates shown is the one indicated in the mission report] from an aircraft that released some bombs, two exploding at the base of the conning-tower, creating some damage, and two aft, while two other bombs remain stuck in the conning-tower, preventing the submarine to dive. The DANDOLO opened fire on the aircraft. The submarine runs on Cape Colonne and then Crotone, where she arrived at 10.40/18 and then returned to Taranto escorted by the corvette SCIMITARRA.
2. The submarine AMBRA at 03:20/18 while emerged about 45 miles S of Cape Spartivento was attacked by an aircraft that released six bombs which exploded very close on both sides under the hull of the submarine, causing serious damage aboard and inhibiting the boat to dive. The submarine is initially immobilized and only after several efforts of the crew manages to re-start the engines heading slowly on surface to Messina, where it will continue on to Naples in tow of the torpedo boat PARTENOPE.
   

The comparison of the attacks appear to left no doubt, given the substantial correspondence of time, location and circumstances and given that there were no other air attacks to submarines in the night and in the area under consideration, that the two attacks of the Wellingtons of 221 Squadron damaged respectively the submarines DANDOLO and AMBRA. The second attack - that of 03.20 - then nothing would have to do with ROMOLO, to speculate whose involvement should be, among other things, address the inconsistencies reported above.

And then as it regards the loss of ROMOLO?

Considering that in the period from 15 to 17 July along the likely route of ROMOLOthere were no other actions correlated with the loss of a submarine, in addition to those already known, the fate of ROMOLO can be, for now, reassessed as:

"Lost by unknown cause after leaving Taranto on the afternoon of 15.07.43"

As for the possible causes, in the absence of any military action correlated and considered the hasty construction, poor training and hasty repair for the failure of the rudder that delayed the departure of ROMOLO, well highlighted in the aforementioned article by Prosperini and in the considerations of the CIS itself, the most likely cause for the sudden disappearance of the submarine with all hands seems to be an incident.

Platon Alexiades comment:

I have read your article on the loss of ROMOLO and I am in agreement to it. The two air attacks were indeed made on DANDOLO and AMBRA as you write.
What caused the loss of ROMOLO?

A minefield laid about 2 miles from Punta Stilo was laid by HMS RORQUAL on 15.05.1943. Could this have caused her loss?
Apparently not as the mines had flooders set for 21.06.1940 so they ought to have been deactivated by this time and some had already been removed by Italian minesweepers. Also ROMOLO was supposed to pass nearly 15 miles from Punta Stilo. Unless:

1. ROMOLO for unknown reasons closed the coast perhaps to save time as she was behind schedule.
2. Perhaps a mine did not deactivate as intended.
   

Of course these are two "ifs" and perhaps none of it is true.

Another possibility is that ROMOLO was lost on an Italian minefield but her outward route appears fairly wide of Italian minefields unless she hit a drifting mine. Her route was through (a) 39°00' N, 17°40' E and (b) 37°45' N, 16°12' E © 37°45' N, 15°45' E then to point S1 (C. Dell'Armi or 37°51' N, 15°41' E), Point M1 (C. Vaticano) then to Naples.

Finally another possibility is that she was lost through a diving accident.

ULTRA had intercepted a signal from Maricosom 1345/16 indicating that REMO and ROMOLO were to pass the meridian 16°06' E at 0200/17 and 0300/17 respectively but this does not seem to have contributed to her loss.
So it seems her loss will remain a mystery until her wreck is found.

Best wishes,

Platon